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Primary Boycotts and Medical Services 
 
 
Philip J. Evans 
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The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA), prohibits the making of, or the giving effect 
to, contracts, agreements or understandings between competitors which purport to prevent 
the supply of goods or services to persons. These arrangements are known as exclusionary 
provisions or primary boycotts. This article discusses the role of the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in enforcing the prohibition of the 
making of exclusionary provisions and the application of the relevant legal principles. An 
understanding of these principles is important to all those involved in allied health 
professions. The article further discusses two recent examples where medical practitioners 
were found to have breached the exclusionary provisions of the TPA by entering into 
arrangements to boycott bulk billing and restrict the provision of after-hours medical 




Recent court actions initiated by the ACCC have made 
it clear that peer group pressure from doctors or 
professional associations, which induce or attempt to 
induce a boycott of bulk billing or restrict access to 
health care services, is a serious breach of the primary 
boycott provisions of the TPA. It is clearly a matter of 
high priority for the ACCC.1 Allied health 
professionals who work in association with medical 
practitioners should be aware of the impact of this 
legislation on the delivery of their services in the health 
care area. 
 
Before considering the legal elements necessary to 
prove the existence of an exclusionary provision, the 
role of the ACCC in enforcing the provisions of the 




                                                 
                                                1 ‘Federal Court Finds Rockhampton Obstetricians’ Boycott 
of “No-Gap” Billing Breached Competition Laws.’ ACCC 
Media Release MR264/02 (31 October 2002). 
The role of the ACCC 
The ACCC is a Commonwealth statutory authority 
responsible for the enforcement of the TPA, which 
deals with the two areas of restrictive trade practices 
and consumer protection. With respect to consumer 
protection, its role complements that of the state 
consumer affairs agencies, which administer the 
consumer protection mirror legislation enacted by the 
states.2
 
The objectives of the ACCC are to: 
 
• improve competition and efficiency in 
markets; 
• foster adherence to fair trading practices in a 
well-informed market; 
•  promote competitive pricing wherever 
possible and to restrain price rises in markets 
where competition is less than effective; and 
 
2 In Western Australia, the relevant legislation is the Fair 
Trading Act 1987. 
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• inform the community about the TPA and its 




Section 45 of the TPA prohibits contracts, 
arrangements or understandings between competitors 
that give effect to what are known as exclusionary 
provisions. An exclusionary provision, which is also 
known as a primary boycott, is a provision in an 
agreement between two or more parties who are in 
competition, which has been made with the purpose of 
preventing or restricting the supply of goods or 
services to, or the acquisition of these goods or 
services from, another person or class of persons.4
 
To establish the existence of an exclusionary provision, 
two elements are necessary: 
 
1. a contract, arrangement or understanding 
(CAU) made between persons, any two of 
whom are in competition. (This is described 
as the horizontal element.); and 
2. the CAU must have the purpose of 
preventing, restricting or limiting the supply 
of goods or services to or from a particular 
person (this is described as the vertical 
element). 
 
These types of arrangement are prohibited outright 
(known as per se prohibitions) by the TPA regardless 
of the effect of competition in the relevant industry or 
profession. 
 
Before section 45 can have any application, it is 
necessary for the ACCC to show that a CAU has been 
made or given effect. This in turn raises two separate 
issues. Firstly, the definition of a CAU, and secondly 
                                                 
                                                
3 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Summary of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Canberra: 
AGPS, 2002). 
4 See section 4D of the TPA for a definition of the term 
‘exclusionary provision.’ 
the evidence necessary to show the existence of a 
CAU. 
 
Contracts, arrangements and understandings 
In the context of trade practices prohibitions it would 
be highly unusual for competitors to enter into a formal 
contract to pursue an illegal purpose. It is more usual 
for competitors to enter into general discussions about 
the state of the particular market, industry or 
profession. These discussions may lead to more subtle 
informal types of agreements or understandings where 
one or more parties indicate what action they propose 
to take with respect to the market in the near future.5
 
Mutuality 
It is not necessary that each party to the agreement 
make a mutual commitment to act in particular way. It 
is sufficient that the parties have communicated with 
one another and have come to an understanding that 
only one party is expected to act in a particular way.6
 
In reality, whether or not there is any requirement for 
mutuality is perhaps insignificant because it is difficult 
to envisage a situation where one competitor would 
make a commitment to act in particular way without 
some similar commitment from another competitor.7
 
Evidence of a CAU 
It is rare for direct evidence of the existence of a CAU 
to be available and reliance is usually placed on 
circumstantial evidence. For example, in situations 
where there is some sudden uniform market behaviour 
by competitors, unless there is some plausible 
commercial reason for the uniform behaviour, the 
courts will presume the existence of a CAU. 
 
 
5 See TPC v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 40 FLR 83; 
Morphett Arms Hotel v TPC (1980) 3 ALR 88; TPC v 
David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FLR 446. 
6 See TPC v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 40 FLR 83. 
7 See Lockhart J in TPC v Email Pty Ltd (1980) 31 ALR 53 
at 66. 
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For example, in TPC v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd,8 
it was held by the court there was an understanding 
evidenced by circumstantial evidence. The 
circumstantial evidence which proved the existence of 
an agreement, was a luncheon attended by a number of 
hotel owners at which one owner indicated that he was 
going to reduce his discount on beer from 16 to 14 per 
dozen and within a short time the same discount was 
offered by the other owners who had attended the 
meeting. 
 
Similarly in TPC v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd9 
(the David Jones case), at a meeting between three 
retailers and a distributor of manchester, it was found 
by the court that the parties arrived at an understanding 
that the retailers would sell the manchester at certain 
prices set out in a list prepared by the distributor. 
While there was no direct evidence of the existence of 
a CAU, the inference was that the retail competitors 
were parties to an understanding. The court placed 
considerable significance on the similar pricing 
structure which the retailers adopted shortly after the 
meeting. Even though the retailers did not price the 
manchester to accord with the distributor’s price list, in 
the light of their previous practices there was 
significant uniformity in their conduct following their 
meeting. 
 
By comparison in TPC v Email Ltd,10 two 
manufacturers of electricity meters, Email and 
Warburton, issued identical price lists, submitted 
identical tenders, adopted the same price variation 
clauses in contracts, and sent to each other their 
respective price lists. The court determined however 
that there was no arrangement or understanding which 
contravened s 45 of the TPA. There was no expectation 
that the party receiving the price list would be induced 
to change its prices. The conduct of the competitors 
was explained by rational commercial considerations 
                                                 
                                                
8 (1979) 40 FLR 83. 
9 (1986) 13 FCR 446. 
10 (1980) 31 ALR 53. 
based on market forces, competition and commercial 
necessity. 
 
Summary of legal principles 
From the above it can be seen that there are three 
elements in establishing whether the agreement 
between competitors is a CAU for the purposes of the 
TPA: 
 
1. the parties have met or communicated with 
each other; 
2. the meeting or communication has raised an 
expectation amongst the parties that a 
particular conduct or action will follow; and 
3. each party accepts that they will behave in 
some agreed manner. 
 
Having established that the agreement was a CAU for 
the purposes of the TPA, the evidence of the existence 
of the CAU will be inferred if there is some uniformity 
in conduct following the meeting or communication. 
 
Competition 
Section 45 is directed towards regulating what are 
termed horizontal restraints on competition, that is, the 
prevention of the making of exclusionary arrangements 
between competitors. In order to satisfy the element of 
‘competition’ only one party is required to be a 
corporation.11 It is not necessary that all the parties 
need be in direct competition with each other but at 
least two must be. These two competitors must be in 
competition with each other with respect to the type of 
goods or services to which the exclusionary provision 
(boycott) relates. 
 
While there is no difficulty in the interpretation of what 
might constitute competition between medical or 
health services providers, there have been instances 
where the courts have had to determine if the parties to 
the agreement were in fact in competition with each 
 
11 ‘Corporation’ is defined in section 4 of the TPA. 
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other. The issue of competition was considered in 
Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association 
(Inc)12 (the Hughes case). 
 
Kim Hughes, a former Australian cricket team captain, 
had led a ‘rebel’ cricket team to South Africa in 
defiance of the ‘Gleneagles Agreement’ between 
Commonwealth nations which prohibited sporting 
contact with South Africa. When he returned, Hughes 
was prevented from playing Test, Sheffield Shield, 
district or club cricket in accordance with the Cricket 
Council rules. These rules had been amended 
following meetings between the Western Australian 
Cricket Association (WACA) and the local cricket 
clubs. 
 
The Federal Court found that the district clubs were in 
competition with each other for the services of 
cricketers. The court held that the amendments to the 
rules were an exclusionary provision which prevented 
Hughes from playing cricket and earning a living. 
 
The purpose 
The exclusionary provision in the CAU between 
competitors must also have the purpose of restricting 
supply of goods or services to a particular person (as in 
the Hughes case) or class of persons (such as 
manchester purchasers in the David Jones case). The 
purpose of the boycott must be common to all parties 
to the CAU. In Carlton & United Breweries v Bond 
Brewing New South Wales Ltd,13 it was held by the 
court that the purpose of a boycott must be common to 
all parties to the CAU before s 45 will apply. For 
example where two competitors enter into a CAU and 
one party wishes to harm the subject group or person 
(the target), and the other enters into the CAU for some 
legitimate commercial purpose, there will be no 
                                                 
                                                
12 (1986) 69 ALR 660. 
13 (1987) ATPR 40-820. 
‘common purpose’ to restrict supply and s 45 will not 
be contravened.14
 
Particular person or class of person 
While the exclusionary provision in the CAU may be 
directed at a particular person,15 it is more usual that 
the exclusionary provision is directed towards a class 
of persons without persons being specifically named.  
 
Enforcement and remedies 
The TPA prescribes a number of remedies for breaches 
of s 45. These include pecuniary penalties, injunctions, 
damages and a broad range of ancillary orders.16 
Examples of typical ancillary orders are mentioned 
below in the discussion of the two cases referred to 
above. With respect to pecuniary penalties, s 76(1)(A) 
of the TPA provides that if a contravention of Part IV 
(the Anti-Competitive Provisions) is established, the 
penalty for a corporation is $10,000,000 for each 
contravention, and in the case of a person, $500,000 
for each contravention. 
 
Recent examples of cases involving boycotts 
Case 1: Boycott of ‘No-Gap’ billing 
In April 2002, the ACCC instituted proceedings 
against three Queensland doctors who provided 
hospital obstetric services in the Rockhampton area. 
The ACCC alleged that there was a provision in an 
agreement between them boycotting the ‘No-Gap’ 
billing arrangements offered by a number of health 
insurance funds.17
 
The ACCC further alleged that the three doctors 
entered into agreements (in December 2000 and 
January 2001) that none of them would provide ‘in-
hospital’ obstetric services to their patients on a ‘No-
 
14 Note also the exclusionary purpose must be a ‘substantial’ 
purpose. That is, it must be a considerable or large part of 
the agreement between the parties. See News Limited v 
Australian Rugby Football League (1996) 64 FCR 410. 
15 See McCarthy v Australian Rough Riders Association Inc 
(1988) ATPR 40–836.  
16 See ss 76, 80, 82 and 87 of the TPA. 
17 See footnote 1. 
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Gap’ billing basis. The result of the boycott was that 
approximately 200 patients were required to pay a gap 
for the in-hospital medical expenses associated with 
the birth of their child. These expenses would not have 
been incurred in the absence of the agreement between 
the three doctors. 
 
This type of agreement is clearly prohibited by the 
primary boycott provisions of the TPA which prohibits 
persons in competition with each other from 
collectively agreeing to prevent, restrict or limit the 
provision of services to particular persons or classes of 
persons. The conduct by the three doctors resulted in 
substantial financial costs to the respective consumers 
of the medical services. 
 
In finding that the doctors had engaged in conduct in 
contravention of the exclusionary provisions of the 
TPA, the Federal Court made a number of orders by 
consent finalising the action by the ACCC against the 
doctors. These orders, made in October 2002, included: 
 
• the repayment of approximately $97,000 to 
the affected patients; 
• findings that all three doctors had engaged in 
conduct in contravention of the TPA; 
• injunctions requiring two of the doctors to 
contribute to the cost of publishing a public 
notice in the local newspaper advising 
residents of the outcome of the matter; and 
• an order requiring the doctors to contribute to 
the ACCC’s legal costs.18 
 
Comment 
An interesting aspect of the action against the doctors 
was that even though one of the doctors had not 
provided his services on a ‘No-Gap’ basis at the time 
of making the arrangement with the other two and his 
patients had always been required to pay a gap and 
                                                                                                 
18 Section 87 of the TPA confers a wide power on the Court 
to make remedial orders in appropriate cases relating to 
prohibited conduct. 
were thus not affected by the agreement, the doctor’s 
conduct in persuading his two colleagues to enter into 
the boycott arrangements had a detrimental impact on 
the other two doctors’ patients. 
 
The ACCC in its action noted that medical 
practitioners who oppose ‘No-Gap’ billing are free to 
act on their own behalf but should respect the right of 
fellow practitioners to conduct their own practices with 
‘No-Gap’ billing if that is their preference. However 
medical and health service providers who are coerced 
or persuaded by others to engage in collective boycotts 
must resist succumbing to that influence as such 
arrangements are prohibited by the TPA and are a high 
priority area for the ACCC. 
 
Case 2: Boycott of bulk billing and restrictions on 
after hours service 
In December 2002, the ACCC instituted proceedings 
against a Melbourne doctor alleging the doctor 
attempted to induce a boycott of bulk billing and after-
hours services by doctors wanting to practice at a 
suburban medical centre.19 The ACCC alleged that the 
doctor had insisted upon the incorporation of ‘Rules’ in 
any leases of the medical centre’s suites. These rules 
imposed obligations on any general practitioners 
operating separate businesses in competition with him. 
These obligations were not to provide bulk billing 
services to patients (with the exception of pensioners, 
Health Card holders or the GP’s immediate family 
members), and not to provide medical services to 
patients after 8pm Monday to Saturday or after 1pm on 
Sundays. 
 
The ACCC alleged that it was the doctor’s intention 
that by incorporating the ‘Rules’ into the leases for the 
medical centre suites, anyone who leased a suite would 
be subject to the ‘Rules’. The Federal Court declared 
that the doctor (specifically the doctor’s incorporated 
 
19 ‘Federal Court Finds Doctor Attempted to Induce Boycotts 
of Bulk-Billing, After Hours Service at Medical Centre.’ 
ACCC Media Release MR 44/03, (7 March 2003). 
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company) by including these rules in the lease had 
attempted to make, and induce a contravention of the 
exclusionary provisions of the TPA.  
competitive due to the detrimental effect on 
competition, and any allegations of boycotts are a high 
priority for action by the ACCC. 
  
The action was settled following mediation. No 
pecuniary penalties were sought by the ACCC against 
the doctor or his company but it was agreed that the 
doctor and his company would pay the ACCC’s costs 
of $10,000.  
Health care providers who are induced by competitors 
to engage in such boycotts must resist succumbing to 
those influences as these arrangements are expressly 
prohibited by the TPA, and the remedies which will be 
imposed by the courts for breaches of the boycott 
provisions are both extensive and onerous on the 
parties to such agreements. 
 
Comment 
In referring to the decision, the Chairman of the 




Peer group pressure from doctors or 
professional associations which induces or 
attempts to induce a boycott of bulk billing by 
competing medical practitioners is a serious 
breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and a 





Parliament has recognised the serious 
detrimental impact on competition and 
consumers of primary boycotts and attempted 
boycott arrangements and has prohibited such 
arrangements outright, that is, without having 




While the examples above address the specific context 
of prohibited conduct by doctors in the provision of 
medical services, the principles and outcomes apply 
equally to corporations, professional associations and 
individuals involved in the provision of health care 
services generally. 
 
While the concern of the ACCC in each of the above 
cases was to ensure that consumers have adequate 
access to health care services, and not to pursue heath 
care providers who are providing such services within 
the law, the TPA deems any boycott arrangement anti-
                                                 
20 See footnote 19. 
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